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ag ~ German submarines to cross the At- ~.many's one chance of winning the SATURDAY, JUNE, 26, 1920. THE EE w PR NR ST a an a | | | | DAILY B TY TV VYTVVVVN 80 8 8/8 000i elie1e ee ee ITISH WHIG | | German U-Boats in American Waters It was in the summer of 1918 that | lies with the outside world, 'and es- Germans made their only attempt | pecially the United States, would be &t what might be called an offensive against their American enemies. We- tween the beginning of May and the end of October, 1918, five German sub- marines crossed the Atlantic and tor- padoed a few ships on our coast. That arines could make this long mey had long been known. Sin- gularly enough, however, the im- Hitsica still prevails in this country the German U-boats were the first to accomplish the feat. In the early fall of 1916 the U-53, command- by that submarine officer, Hans , whg has been previously men- | tioned in 'these articles, crossed the | Atlantic, dropped in for a call at Newport, R.I, and on the way back sank a few merchant vessels off Nan- tucket. A few months previously the ro-called merchant submarine Deut- land had made its trip to Newport ews. The German press and even some pro-German sympathizers in this country hailed these achieve- ments as marking a glorious page in the record of the German navy. Doubtless the real purpose was to show the American people how eas- ily these destructive vessels could cross the Atlantic; and to impress upon their minds the fate which awaited them in case they maintain- gd their rights against the Prussian ully. As a matter of fact, it had been proved long before the Deutsch- land or the U-53 had made their voy- ages that submarines could cross the Atlantic. In 1915 not one but ten submarines had gone from North America to Europe under their own power. Admiral Sir John Fisher tells about this expedition in his recently blished memoirs. In 1914 the Bri- ish Admiralty had contracted for submarines with Charles M. Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel Company. As international law pro- hibited the construction of war ves- gels by a neutral in war time for the usq of a belligerent with which it was a¥ peace, the parts of ten submarines were sent to Canada where they were t together. These submarines en crossed the Atlantic under their own power, and were sent from Bri- tish ports to the Dardanelles, where they succeeded in driving Turkish-and | German shipping out of the Sea of Marmora. been accomplished before the Ger- tons made their voyages. It was therefore not necessary for the two lantic to prove that the thing could pe done; but the Germans doubtless Be- lieved that this demcnstration of their ability to operate on the Ameri- ean coast would serve as a warning to the American people. What They Would Have Meant We were never at all deceived as to what would be the purpose of such a visit after our entrance into the war. the early part of 1917 the Allies ved that the German U-boats might assail our coast, and I so in- ed the Navy Department at Washington. My cables and letters of 1917 explained fully the reasons why Germany might indulge in such & gesture. Strategically, as these despatches make clear, such attacks would have no great military value. To have sent a sufficient number of submarines to do any considerable Thus a crossing of the | Atlantic by American submarines had Jama on the American coast, would ro a great mistake. Ger- war with the submarine weapon was to destroy shipping to such an extent that the communications- of the Al The only places where the sub- cut. be conducted marine warfare could | with some chance of success were the ccean passage routes which lead to European ports, especially in that area south and southeast of Ireland in which were focused the trade routes for ships sailing from all parts of the world and destined for British and French ports. With the number of submarines available the Germans sibly, as the newspaper writer has pointed out, they might seize a desert- ed island off the coast of Maine or in the Caribbean, and cache there a 1eservoir of fuel and food; unless, however, they could also create at these places adequate facilities 'for repairing submarines or supplying them with torpedoes and ammunition, such a place would not serve the pur- pose of a base at all. Comparatively few of the German submarines could have made the cruise to the American [owt the best place to ganda. The press was full of reports that such attacks were about to be made. German agents were continu- ally circulating these reports. Raids For Moral Effect. Of course it was clear from the first to the heads of the Allied navies and to all naval authorities who were in- formed as to the actual conditions, that these attacks by German sub- marines on the American coast would | only be in the nature of raids for moral effect. It was also quite clear from the first, as I pointed out in my despatches to the Navy Department, defend our coast was in the critical submarine areas in 'the Eastern Atlantic, through which the submarines had to pass in setting out for our coast, and in which alone they could have any hope of succeeding in the military object of the submarine campaign. Jt was not necessary 'to keep our de- easily cross the Atlantic in ten days. 1t is therefore apparent that a flotilla "of destroyers stationed. in European waters could. protect the American coast from submarines almost as sue- cessfully as if it were stationed at Hampton Roads or Newport. "Such a flotilla would be of no use at these American stations unless there were submarines attacking shipping off the coast; but as soon as the German started for America--a detail of which, as I shall explain, we always were in fact informed--we could send our destroyers after them. These agile vessels could reach home waters about three wecks befre the subma- rines arrived; they would thus have plenty of time to refit. and to wel- come the uninvited guests. From any conceivable point of view, therefore, there was no excuse for keeping das- troyers in the Eastern Atlantic for "home defense." Moreover, the fact that we could keep this close track of again friendly relations. In 1917 they therefore refrained from any acts which might arouse popular hat- red against them. We had more than one indication of this attitude. Early in the summer of 1917 we obtained from one of the captured German submarines a set of orders issued to it by the German Admiralty Staff. Among thése was one dated May 8, 1917, in which the submarine = com- manders were informed that Germany had not declared war upon the United States, and that, until further in- $®ructions were received, the subma- lines were to continue to look upon America and American shipping as neutral. The submarine commanders were especially warned against at- tacking or committing any overt act against such American war-vessels as might be encountered in European waters. The orders explained that no official confirmation had been re- ceived by the German Government of the news which had been published in the press that America had declar- ed way, and that, therefore, the Ger- mans officially were ignoring our~bel- ligerence. From their own standpoint such a licy of endeavoring not to ciffend America, even after she be- came a belligerent, may have seem- ed politically wise; from a military point of view, their failure to attempt the submarine demonstration off our coast in 1917 was a great mistake; for when they finally started warfare on our coast, the United States was deeply involved in hostilities, and had already begun the transportation of the great army which produced such decisive results on the Western Front. The time had passed, as experience soon showed, when any mere demon- stration on our coast would distur the calm of the American people or affect their will ta victory. The U-151 In late April, 1918, I learned through the secret service channels that one of the large submarines of The mines moved on little railroad tracks toward second intervals into the water. could keep enough of their U-boats at work in these areas to destroy a large number of merchant ships. Germany this needed to concentrate all of her available submarines at these points; she had dn inadequate numbey for her purposes; to send any considerable force 3,000 miles across the Atlantic would simply weaken her efforts in the real scene of warfare and would make her submarine cam- paign a failure. The cruises of sub- marines on the American coast would have been much longer and would have been a much more serious strain on the submarines than were the shorter cruises in the inshore waters of Europe. As has already been ex- plained the submarine did not differ from other craft in its need for con- stant repairs and careful upkeep, ex- cept that it was perhaps a more deli- cate instrument of warfare than any other naval craft, and that it would require longer and more frequent per- iods of overhaul. The Germans had 10 submarine bases in American wa- ors and could establish none. Pos- ONLY TABLETS MARKED "BAYER" ARE ASPIRIN Not Aspirin at All without the "Bayer Cross" The name "Bayer" identifies the only genuine Aspirin --the Aspirin prescribed by physicians for over nine- years and now made in Canada. . oy buy an unbroken 1 contains proper directions for Colds, Headache, Toothache, Earache, Neu- ralgia, Lumbago, Rheumatism, Neuri- tis, Joint Pains, and Pain generally. Tin boxes of 12 tablets cost but "Bayer Tablets of Aspirind which 'a few cents. Larger "Bayer" packages. There is only one Aspirin--"Bayer'--You must say "Bayer" Aspirin is the trade mark (reristered In Canada) of Baver Manufacture of Mono- ester of Salleylicacid. "While it is well known that Aspirin means Bayer a to assist the public against imitations, the Tablets of Bayer Company be stamped with their geacral trade Cross." yd ¥ ON THE LAUNCHING DECK. coast and operate. successfully there so far away from their bases for any considerable time. Anything resembling an attacking force on American harbors was there- fore improbable. 'Yet it seemed from the first that the Germans would send an occasional submarine into our waters, as a measure of propaganda rather than for the direct military result that would be achieved. Ameri- can destroyers and other vessels were essential to the success of the whole anti-submarine campaign of the Al- lies. The sooner they could all be sent into the critical European wa- ters the sooner the German scheme of terrorism would end. If these des- troyers or any considerable part of them could be kept indefinitely in American waters, the Germans might win the war. Any manoeuver which would have as its result the keeping of these American vessels, so indi pensable to the Allies, out of the field of active warfare would thus be more than justified, and,§ indeed, would indicate the highest wisdom on the payt of the German navy. The Napoleonie principle of dividing your enemies forces is just as valuable in naval as in land warfare. For many years Admiral Mahan had been in- structing American naval officers that the first rule in warfare is not to divide your fighting forces, but always to keep them together, so as to bring the whole weight at a given moment against your adversary, Two of the fundamental principles of the science of warfare, on land and sea alike, are contained in the maxims: Keep your own forces concentrated and always «ndeavor to divides those of the en- emy. Undoubtedly the best method which Germany could use to keep our destroyers in our own waters was to make the American people believe that their lives and property were in danger; they might accomplish this' by sending a submarine to attack our shipping off New York and Boston hw go Atlantic seaports, and pos- sibly even to bombard our harbors. The Germans doubtless believed that they might create such alarm and arouse. such public clamor in the United States that our destroyers and other anti-submarine craft would be kept over here by the Navy Depart- ment, in response to the popular agi- tation to protect our 6wn coast. This is the 'reason why American head- quarters in London, and the Allied ad- miralties, expected such a visitation. The Germans obviously endeavored to 'create the impression that such an at- tack was likely to occur at any time. is was part of their war propa- v the sterny whence they dropped at about ten Each mine lay ing ship carried about 500 on an average. stroyers in American waters, patrol ling the vast expanse of our three thousand miles af coastline, futile effort to find and destroy such enemy submarines as might attack the American coast. So long as these attacks were only sporadic and car- ried out by the type of submarine which used its guns almost exclusive- lv in sinking ships, and which select- ed for its victims unarmed and un- protected ships, destroyers and other anti-submarine craft would be of no possible use on the Atlantic coast The submarine could see these craft from a much greater distance than it could itself be seen by them; and by diving and sailing submerged it could easily avoid them and sink its victims without ever being sighted or attacked by our_own patrols, how- ever numerous they might have been. Even in the narrow waters of the English Channel, up to the very end of the war, submarines were success- fully attacking small merchant craft by 'wunfire, although the density of patrol craft in this area was naturally a thousand times greater than we could ever have provided for the vast expanse of our own coast. Conse- quently, so long as the submarine at- tacks on the American coasts were only sporadie, it was absolutely futile to maintain patrol craft in those wa- ters, as this could not provide any adequate defense against such scat- tered demonstrations. If, on the other hand, the Germans had ever de- cided to commit the military mistake of concentrating a considerable num- per of submarines off our Atlantic ports, we could always have counter- ed such a step by sending back from the war zone an adequate number of craft to protect coefivoys in and out of the Atlantic ports, in the same manner that convoys were protected in the submarine danger zone in Eu- ropean waters. This is a fact which even many naval men did not seem to grasp. Yet have already explgined that we ew practically where every Ger- man submarine was at a given time. We knew whenever pne left a German port; and we kept track of it day by day until it rcturned home. No U- t ever made a voyage across the Adfantic without our knowledge. The submarine was a slow traveller and required a minimum of thirty days for such a trip; normally the time would be much longer, for a subma- rine on this long voyage seldom cruis- ed at more than five knots an hour. Our destroyers and anti-submarine craft were much f; and could in a' MINE GOING The ten vessels made thirteen Sea laying about 5,000 mines each trip. the United States, shipped to Norfolk, Va., thence sent to Fort William and Loch Alsh, Scotland, and from these latter points sent to baseg at Inverness and Invergordon by the Highland Rallway and the Cale- donian Canal. submarines in itself formed a great protection against them. I have al- ready explained how we routed con- voys entering British waters in such {ays that they could sail around the U-boats and thus escape contact. I think that this simple procedute sav- ed more shipping than any other me.- thod. In the same way we could keep these vessels sailing from American ports outside of the area in which the submarines were known to be pperat- ing in our own waters. Why? Yet the enemy sent no submarines to our coast in 1917; why they dil not do so may seen difficult to un- derstand for that'was just the period when 4 campaign of this kind might have served their purpose. During this time, however, we had repeated indications that the Germans did not take the American entrance into the war very seriously; moreover, look- ing Jorwant jo, conditions, after the peace, ey perhaps hoped that mightsoon be able to establish once OVERBOARD. so-called excursions into the North The mines were all made in the, Deutschland class had left its German base on April 19th for a long cruise. On the first of May, 1918, I therefore cabled to the De- partment that there were indications that this submarine was bound for our own coast. A few days after- ward 1 received more specific infor- mation, through the interception of ! radio despatches between the subma- rine and its German base; and there- fore I' cabled the Department, this time informing them "that the sub- pmarine was the U-151, that it was now well on its way across the At- lantie, and that it could be expected lo begin operations off the American coast any time after May 20th. | gavé a complete description of the vessel and the probable nature of her cruise, and her essential military | characteristics. She carried a supply | of mines, and I therefore invited the | attention of the Department to the fact that the favorite areas for lay- | ing mines were those places where | hey] Since at Delaware Bay pilots the ships stopped to pick up plots, : f ships were taken on just south of the Five Fathom Bank Light, I suggest- ed that it was not unlikely that the U-161 would attempt to lay mines in that yicinity. Now the fact is thas we knew that thé U-151 intended to lay mines at this very place. We had obtained this piece of information from the radio we had intercepted; as there was a good chance that our own cable might fall into German kands, we did not care to give the news in the precise form in which we had received it, as we did not intend that he should know that we had means of keeping so accurately ine formed. As had been predicted, the U-151 proceeded directly to the vicins ity of this Five Fathom Bank off Delaware Bay, laid" her mines * and then, cruising north up the coast, began her demonstration on the 26th of May by sinking two small wooden schooners. On July 29th 1 informed Washing- ton that another U-boat was them coming down the west coast of Ire- land, bound for the United States, and that it would arrive some time after July 16th. Complete reports of this vessel were sent from day to' day as it made its slow progress across the ocean. On July 6th I cabled that still another U-boat had started for our coast; and the progress of this ade venturer, with all details as to 'its character and probable area of operas tions, were also forwarded regularly, From the end of May until October, there was nearly always one sub marine operating off our cogst. The largest number active at any One time was in August, when "far a week or ten days three were more or less ac tive in attacking coastwise vessels: These three performed all the way from Cape Hatteras'to Newfoundland, attempting by these taeties to create the impressions 'that dozens of hose tile U-boats were preying upon oug commerce and threatening our shores. THese submarines, however, attacked almost exclusively sailing vessels and small coastwise steamers, rarely, if ever, using torpedoes. A number of mines were laid at different points off our ports, on what the Germans be- lieved to be the traffic routes; but the information which we had concerning them made it possible to counter sue= cessfully their 'efforts and, from a military point of view, the whole of the submarine operations off our coast can be dismissed as one of the minor incidents of the war, as the Secretary of the Navy described it in his Annual Report. The five subma~ rines sunk in all approximately 110,» 000 tons of shipping, but the vessels were, for the most part, small and of no great miltary importance. The only real victory was the destruction of the cruiser San Diego, which was sunk by a mine which had been laid by the U-156 off Fire Island. (To be continued.) Copyright, 1920, by the World's Work. The copyright of these articles in Great Britain is strictly reserved by Pearson's Magazine, London} without their permission no quotas tion may be made. 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