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1% i y We reproduce them . in , undying memory of the heroic dead of what was to have been in the cause of jus-- tice and fraternity of the peoples of the world, but instead turned out to be the cause of triumph of the most impudent egoism of some Nations to the detriment of other 'peoples, the prime cause of the present uneasi-- ness in Europe. Italy had to enidure the injustice, which they wished to repeat by sanc-- tions. The following lines conclude a re-- cent book by Colonel Mario Carac-- ciolo, published May 24th, 1935, en-- titled "Italy in the World War". We publish them also for the sur-- vivors of that great tragedy, especi-- ally for the Italian Returned Sol-- diers living in Canada, ever proud of their achievements, ever ready to defend the land of their birth, al-- though faithful citizens of Canada. And last but by no means least, the purpose of this -- publication, on the anniversary of the day that Ita-- ly entered the World War, is to let our Canadian friends know the main reason which grieves Italy, to--day that she is decided to obtain, at a high cost, a place in the sun for her increasing po pulation. an d sees the road -- obstructed by her ex--Allies who gained so much by the sacrifices of the Italian people. through the local. press to--d a y pvarallels the menace which the Allies presented to Italy when she did not want to accept the Treaty of Versailles: "You only have eno-- ugh to eat for ten days; we will starve you." Anno VIII, No The local press used every art to deceive the Canadian public, it may have succeeded in hoodwinking a few, but it can never change true facts. s ENGLISH -- SECTION ALLIED FORCES IN ITALY AND ITALIAN FORCES ABROAD English: December 1917 and January from February 1918 on ...........:.. In France -- from March 1918 on (2nd Army Corps) -- from January._ 1918 (T A I F) ……… -- Centurions, different workmen ....... French: December 1917 and January 1918: about 120,000; from February: 1918 on ....;.;... .t sls ies w ult In French --....sl.....;. Emnpglish .. ............ Czecko--Slavakian ..... American --..:......,! In In In The unfair treatment -- received Czecko--Slavakian: October 1918 Americans: October 1918 ...... Macedonia ……… Albania ..........,.. other theatres of war France. …… sss rià Macedonia (approximate) Albania (approximate) .. MAY 24th, 1915 Total foreign forces in Italy Total Italian forces $ 2o.m è ! ITALY'S TWO WARS Total in France Losses Of Italian Forces Abroad Losses Of Allied Forces In Italy Total 22,870 Total 9,181(not through cause of war) Allied Forces In Italy Italian Forces Abroad FOUGHT FOR THE OTHERS .. 5,000 abroad 14,870 2,182 6,097 291 11 The. intervention of foreign poli-- tical factors and interests of every kind took «this and many other fruits of victory from the Italian army . )i i The armistice of Villa Giusti halt-- ed the Italian , army, : which . could have, reached Vienna unimpeded. 'To future historians the fact will appear strange indeed that the terms of the armistice were made not by Italy, who practically alone had fo-- ught for a long time with. Austria and had finally defeated her, but by those Allies who throughout the war, except for short periods, were almost disinterested in our operati-- Thus a military _ victory, the like of which few or perhaps none can be found in history, because never be-- fore was such a military power re-- duced to nothing, was deformed and besides tens of thousands of sick. 1918 The Austro--Italian front is curved for about 600 kms. -- held by 30 and then (60 divisions -- bound on the north by mountains and on the south by the sea -- is trespassed by only two railways and few roads -- the armies fighting on the Isonzo have communication only with the west. 'Is"'e/.,,b @l -- i 4 _ e esA S e 1 h l % i È "'%;» y _ -- e A9R!A1| e o f Sz 69 1 about Wîe"e., . 2 g 110,000 il BOLLE T TINO The Franco--German front is in all rectilinear for 600 kms. -- held by 176 and then 200 divisions -- at its shoulders is a region ample and rich in resources -- served. by countless roads and railways of every kind. Entered at Ottawa Post Office as Second Class Mail Matter. ITALY JOINED THE ALLIES IN THE GREAT WAR 112,000 131,000 281,500 32,000 62,000 51,000 60,000 20,000 15,000 3,000 48,500 95,000 7,000 What we. contributed to the war we stated in preceding chapters and we will sum up here again, but once more I will -- repeat . that it is much more than what we should have by the -- treaty of London, because we were bound to attack an Austria en-- iga.ged with Russia and Serbia, whe-- reas we fought against all of Aus-- tria and alone. To mention a few: we . engaged with ever increasing Austrian forces, from. 20--25 enemy _ divisions which we fought against in June '15, to 35 in '16, 40 in '17, and after » October 55, of which 8 were German, and 55 to 60 in 18, thus --practically the whole -- Austrian army. This is not the place to expound what happened in the period between the armistice at Villa Giusti and the Treaty of. Versailles. The painful story of all coalition wars was re-- newed once again, . perhaps harder than ever. One who looks at Europe to--day, fifteen years after the end of the war, must agree that there was peace in name only. Furthermore:.. in --.thée final battle of Vittorio Veneto the whole allied aid was . equivalent to 3 or 4 foreign divisions (there were six: 2 French, 3 English and 1 Czecko--Sla-- vakian) but two large Italian divi-- sions were in France), and 3,000 American «soldiers (1). With the French army in France there were about 60 English -- divisions, 12 Bel-- gian, several Portugese contingents, and 2. million Americans. diminished by foreign interventions. rests, so -- many egoisms, so many passions, so many vexations, so ma-- ny hypocrisies, so much ignorance, gathered together to solve so many problems. . Moreover: while we lost 14,870 men in France and 3,000 in Macedo-- nia (besides tens of thousands of sick) the Allies in Italy lost 9,181 al-- together. (1) Italy, a young nation fighting its first national war, mobilized almost 6 million men, lost 680,000 dead, 1,-- 050,000 wounded and 500,000 mutil-- ated. Her military marine. lost 108,281 tons of craft, . and the> mercantile marine 872,341 (238 steamers and 395 vessels). Italian losses amount-- In this concern. suffice it to say that adversity of fate and con-- spiracy of man would not give what the treaties assigned . them, while they. had accomplished much more than was expected. Never, in fact, were so many inte-- M A_ RE DE SVIZZERA In spite of so much sacrifice, when the time for adjusting: accounts ar-- rived, even that which was due Ita-- ly according to the treaties was denied her. According to the treaty of London, we should receive the Trentino right to the Brennero, Tri-- este and her district, Istria right to Quarnaro with Cherso and Lussin; part of Dalmatia with the islands and--in Albania--Valona and the in-- terior of Vojussa. The part of Dal-- matian coast not assigned us should have been neutralized and passed on to the "future state of Croatia or to Serbia and Montenegro". In the economic field, Italy, a poor nation -- without raw -- materials or other riches save her marvelous sun, squeezed from her means the neces-- sities of war, increasing her public debt from 19 milliards (1913) to 103 milliards (1920), and had thus a debt and a decrease of riches superior, to that of any other ally. Consequently, at the end of the war, the cost of living was higher in Italy than in all other nations. (2) It so happens that these observa-- tions have been exceptionally. fruit-- ful. The campaign, which has. achi-- eved such startling successes in re-- cent weeks, offers the basis for, so-- me general -- conclisions--with the obvious reservation that a . colonial campaign is not a European war. The Ethiopian campaign has presen-- ted some problems peculiar to itself, the most important of which lay in the fact that the enemy was, from the military point of view, a savage with a thin veneer of European tra-- ining. But if we have not here the ideal conditions of a manoeuvre south of the Brenner Pass or in Al-- sace--Lorraine, there is the more im-- portant factor that this has been in deadly earnest. Î "We live to learn" in war as in 'peace. Lessons have been drawn from the Italian campaign in Ethi-- opia that the world will undoubtedly --and unfortunately--adapt in futu-- re wars. There would be few per-- sons today so optimistic as to believe that Europe will not see another war in the near or distant future. Cer-- tainly, no genera] -- staff--not even ours in the United States--could 'af. ford to ignore the advances in the theory of warfare that have been made here in Ethiopia, and it is safe to say that military experts every-- where have looked eagerly in this direction for the past six months. For all the problem has been the sa-- ed to 49% of the entire fleet, while the English were about 41% and the French 46% . me: to what use can Italian experi-- ences be put in the next war? A theory has been put to the test, and it is particularly valuable that the theory in question is Italian--so far as any technique can be nation-- rlized. It is the principle of the "guerra manovrata" (the war of manoeuvre) . The World War was fought by huge armies, locked almost immov-- REWRITTEN BY TT ALY Science of War (From "The New York Times Magazine, May 10, 1936) Venerdi 22, Maggio 1936 WE FiGHT FOR OUR EMPIRE By Herbert L. Mathews Furthermore, by the accords of S. Giovanni di_ Moriania -- (April 20, 1917) it 'was established that in the distribution of the Tunrkish provin-- ces Italy was to have Smirne and its hinterland. ably in intricate trench systems. It was a "war of position," dependent in the long run on the amount of man power, war materials and econ-- omic and financial resources that could .be.thrown into the battle. It was a war of national stamina, fear-- fully wasteful of men and 'materi-- als--two vast forces locked in' an im-- mutable grip of death. There is no one who has . thought . about the World= War but has cursed the folly of the general staffs; which blindly prepared nations and men for that horror. ) The error was realized in a very few months, but it was too late. It would have been suicidal for either side to relax that grim embrace. But as month followed month in appal-- ling slaughter, feeble efforts were made to break away from the "war of position" and return to the old-- fashioned but infinitely more effec-- tive "war of movement." The at. tempt could hardly be called success-- ful, but at least a little progress was made toward the end of the war. On the Italian side, it was fitting that. Marshal (then General) Pietro Badoglio should have been the lead-- ing exponent of the struggle for mo-- bility. "Vittorio Veneto" was one of the best examples which the war ga-- ve of a successful attempt at a vi-- olent fracture of a seemingly im-- movable front. It was the first, em-- bryonic effort at what was to be-- come the theory of the "guerra ma-- novrata," which is today the basic concept of the Italian General Staff. The essence of the theory, as its name indicates, is to fight a dyna-- mic, not a static, combat. Everyone knows that neither Smir-- ne nor Dalmatia were ceded to Italy. Moreover, the great booty: of the German colonies were hitherto divid-- In the Italian conception, the op-- posing forces start from comparati-- vely distant points. One attacks and the other defends, or sometimes both move to the attack. In either case the principle is the same; the out. Telefono: WA. 7306 Italian craft lost during the war. This, then, is the general principle of the war of movement--a principle by no means peculiarly Italian, for most, if not all, general staffs thro-- ughout the world have adopted it. But what the Italians have done is to develop this principle in a fashion peculiar to themselves, and to bring it as near to perfection as has yet been possible. _ How is that to be done? In the first place, by not making a simple, and solid, frontal attack. The assa_ ult must be in short, sharp thrusts at more than one point, with mobile units. The idea is to break through the line of the enemy, or to encircle his position so effectively that he must withdraw or face the . deadly effects of a flank attack. The defen-- se must move forward to meet such an attack half way, thus gaining the impetus and moral effect of launch-- ing an attack, or it must seek to hold its positions with a part of its forces, manoeuvring with the rest to catch the enemy on the flank and force his withdrawal. 4 Italy 91,000 kms., 150,000 inhabi-- tants. The Italian innovation, on the tac-- tical side, is to divide a given milita-- ry force--whether it be a battalion or an army of two or three complete corps--into three groups, or forces, of approximately equal size. In prac-- tice, the first and second groups usually turn out to be larger than the third, but the effect is the same. Each group is a self--supporting, self--contained unit--a miniature ar-- my, with sufficient food, water, mu-- nitions, artillery, tanks, airplanes, engineering and transport materials to permit it to exist by itself, cut off from all communications, for at least two or three days during ac-- tual combat, and indefinitely during intervals. However, while the fight-- ing groups are confined to three for. ces, the "logistical" or service units are four in number, since behind the army as a whole is a fourth body coordinating the furnishing of sup-- plies of all kinds to the three fight. ing units. -- The first of the active groups (Continued on page 6) ed thus: England (and Dominions) 1,898,000 kms. with 4,895,000 inha-- bitants; France 48 9,000 kms., 3,700,000 habitants; Belgium 54,000 kms, 3,000,000 habitants; È come must be decisive and, above all, a deadlock must be avoided. ENGLISH SECTION (Continued on page 8) TORONTO, Canada in-- in--